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I. INTRODUCTION
HISTORY WILL NO doubt record that the most propitious
opportunities for an overall peace in the Middle East occurred after
the October 1973 war and after President Sadat's Jerusalem visit of Octo-
ber 1977. The first opportunity resulted in a limited agreement on the
disengagement of forces between Egypt and Israel in May of 1974. This
was followed in September of 1975 by the Sinai Interim Agreement be-
tween Israel and Egypt, although there was no similar agreement between
Syria and Israel. The second opportunity yielded even more tangible re-
sults between Egypt and Israel in the form of the 1978 Camp David
Agreements, and the 1979 Peace Treaty between the two countries. De-
spite common belief, these post-1973 developments were not an innova-
tion in Egyptian peace policy toward Israel.1 This article will explore
Egypt's peace policy as it unfolded over more than a decade.
II. EGYPT'S GENERAL POLICY FRAMEWORK: 1967-19782
Since 1967, Egypt's policy toward Israel has been aimed at achieving
an overall peaceful political settlement of the issues involved in the Arab
world's conflict with Israel. More specifically, Egypt has predicated its
peace policy on five substantive principles. The first calls for complete
Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since the 1967 war,
subject to effective reciprocal security guarantees. The second recognizes
the Palestinians' right to self-determination, including the establishment
* This article is based on several meetings between the author and high-ranking gov-
ernment officials and diplomats in Egypt, the United States, Syria, Jordan, Israel, and
P.L.O. officials. The author emphasizes that the views expressed herein are solely his own
and do not represent those of any government, organization, or public official.
** Professor of Law, DePaul University. J.D. (1964) Indiana University; LL.M. (1966)
John Marshall Law Institute; S.J.D. (1973) George Washington National Law Center. Ful-
bright-Hays Visiting Professor of International Criminal Law, The University of Freibourg
1970; Visiting Professor of Law, New York University 1971; Guest Scholar, Woodrow Wilson
International Law Center for Scholars 1972.
1 Egypt in 1951 joined in the U.N. Conciliation Committee talks in Lausanne, Switzer-
land; and in 1954-55 under Presidents Nagib and Nasser contacts and feelers on peace were
made between Egypt and Israel.
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHITE PAPER ON PEACE INI-
TATIVES UNDERTAKEN BY PREsIDENT AwAR AL-SADAT (1971-1977). For an Israeli view see
S. SHAMIR, EGYPT UNDER SADAT.- THE SEARCH FOR A NEw ORIENTATION (1978).
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of a Palestinian State on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The third prin-
ciple designates the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) as the
representative of the Palestinian people. The fourth mandates the recog-
nition of Israel. The fifth requires the conclusion of a permanent peace
treaty between all parties concerned in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
These fundamental principles derive from those enunciated in U.N.
Security Council Resolution 2423 which was accepted by Egypt and Israel,
and was subsequently embodied in Security Council Resolution 338," and
from other prior General Assembly Resolutions.5 The main tenets of
these two resolutions are the return by Israel of "occupied territories" in
the 1967 conflict; the resolution of the Palestinian "refugee problem"; rec-
3 22 U.N. SCOR (1382d mtg.) 8. U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/REv. 2 (1967). For a critique of
this Resolution, particularly its reference to the Palestinians as "Refugees," see Bassiouni,
The Middle-East in Transition: From War to War: A Proposed Solution, 4 INT'L LAW. 379
(1970); The Palestinians: Refugees, or a People?, THE CATHOLIC WORLD (Sept. 1970); Bas-
siouni & Fisher, The Arab-Israeli Conflict-Real and Apparent Issues: An Insight into the
Future From the Lessons of the Past, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 399 (1970); Bassiouni, The
Middle-East: The Misunderstood Conflict, 19 KAN. L. REV. 373 (1971). See also, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations and Movements, Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (Apr. 4, 1974) and statement of M.C. Bassiouni at 21-33, and
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., (July 23-24, 1975) and Statement of M.C. Bas-
siouni at 57-89. See also notes 9 and 10 infra.
4 28 U.N. SCOR (1747th mtg.) 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/29 (1973).
5 For additional resolutions pertaining particularly to the Palestinian question see G.A.
Res. 302, 4 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/1251, at 23 (1949); G.A. Res. 394, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 20) 24, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950); G.A. Res. 512, 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 11, U.N.
Doc. A/2119 (1952); G.A. Res. 614, 7 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 7 U.N. Doc. A/2361,
(1952); G.A. Res. 818, 9 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) 6, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953); G.A. Res.
818, 9 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) 8, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954); G.A. Res. 916, 10 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 19) 7, U.N. Doc. A/3116 (1955); G.A. Res. 1018, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 17) 6, U.N. Doc. A/3572 (1957); G.A. Res. 1315, 13 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 8, U.N.
Doc. A/3805 (1957); G.A. Res. 1315, 13 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 9, U.N. Doc. A/4090
(1958); G.A. Res. 1456, 14 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 8, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959); G.A. Res.
1604, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16A, Vol. II) 6, U.N. Doc. A/4684/Add. 1 (1961); G.A. Res.
1725, 16 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 11, U.N. Doc. A/510 (1961); G.A. Res. 1856, 17 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 11, U.N. Doe. A/5217 (1962); G.A. Res. 1912, 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 15) 20, U.N. Doc. A/5575 (1963); G.A. Res. 2052, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 15,
U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); G.A. Res. 2154, 21 U.N. GOAR, Supp. (No. 16) 19, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1966); G.A. Res. 2341, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 21, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967);
G.A. Res. 2452, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 21, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res. 2535,
24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 25, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A. Res. 2672, 25 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 21) 35, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 2792, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29)
46, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 2963, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 27, U.N. Doc.
A/8739 (1972); G.A. Res. 3089, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 26, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973);
G.A. Res. 3236, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631), (1974); G.A. Res. 3376,
30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 3, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); G.A. Res. 31/15, 31 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 48, U.N. Doe. A/31/39 (1976). See also notes 9 and 10 infra.
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ognition of the "political independence and territorial integrity" of all
parties; and the establishment of a "just and lasting peace" between
Israel and the Arab parties to the conflict.
Since 1967, Egypt has considered the principles of Resolution 242 as
its basic negotiating framework though, in certain respects6, it is ambigu-
ous. For example, in its statement of principles, the resolution emphasizes
that territorial acquisition by force is not permissible, and then the reso-
lution in its operative paragraph refers to the withdrawal from occupied
territories without specific reference to all territories occupied since 1967.
This has given rise to divergent interpretations. The resolutions are also
ambiguous in that they fail to give a timetable for the return of the terri-
tories. Furthermore, the rights of the Palestinians are recognized only in
terms of their refugee status and not as a national entity with the right of
self-determination. Finally, the language "just and lasting peace" is
equivocal and lends itself to multiple contextual interpretations.
The examples enumerated above typify the vagueness and ambiguity
which permeate Resolution 242. This can be attributed in a large part to
the desire of the drafters of the Resolution to use language conducive to a
negotiated peace. Unfortunately, this poor draftsmanship has led to con-
flicts with other related U.N. Resolutions. Thus, while Resolution 242 re-
fers to Palestinians as refugees, Resolution 25357 and Resolution 32368 (as
well as others) refer to the Palestinians' "inalienable right to self-
determination."
Moreover, it became evident that Egypt's actual policy principles
were and continue to be contrary to Israel's interpretation of Resolutions
242 and 338 regarding the return of occupied territories, which Egypt
considered as being unequivocally all territories, and concerning the right
of the Palestinians to self-determination, which Egypt interpreted as in-
cluding the right to establish an independent state on the West Bank and
Gaza Strip though conceding the need for an interim "autonomy" stage.
In 1976, Egypt sought to clarify the ambiguities of Resolution 242. It
joined other states in sponsoring a draft resolution amending Resolution
24210 before the Security Council debate on the Middle East Question in
6 Bassiouni, The Middle East in Transition: From War to War, A Proposed Solution,
4 IN'L LAw 397 (1970).
* 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 25, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
* 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
1 See, PALESTINE: CONCORDANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 1967-1971 (F.
Sayegh & S. Soukhary eds. 1971); Resolutions and Decisions of the General Assembly and
the Security Council Relating to the Question of Palestine, 1947-1975, 31 U.N. GAOR, Com-
mittee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Right of the Palestinian People, U.N. Doc. A/AC.
183/L.2 (1976); M.C. BASSIOUNI, THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND NA-
TIONAL INDEPENDENCE (Association of Arab-American University Graduates (A.A.U.G.), In-
formation Paper No. 22; December 1978).
" Report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian
People, U.N. Doc. A/AC 183 L.2, Mar. 5, 1976, A/12090, May 29, 1976.
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January, 1976.11 The proposed resolution dealt forthrightly with both the
territorial and Palestinian issues. As to the first, it sought to clarify that
Israel must withdraw from "all territories occupied in the 1967 war." As
to the Palestinian issues, it sought to harmonize Resolution 242 with Res-
olutions 2535 and 3236. The latter Resolution recognized the Palestinians'
"inalienable right to self-determination" in Palestine, and therefore to re-
move from Resolution 242 the reference to the Palestinians as "refugees."
The proposed 1976 Resolution was, however, vetoed by the United States.
In 1977, diplomatic efforts were renewed to achieve the same objec-
tive. The United States proved amenable to such a resolution, provided
that the P.L.O. would accept a new formula whereby Israel would be rec-
ognized as a sovereign state and the 1964 Palestine National Covenant
would be amended to conform to that new perspective. Because the
P.L.O. refused to agree to this, as did Israel, that effort failed as had the
previous one. Egypt was left with no other alternative than to try to nego-
tiate its way out of these inconsistencies.
In attempting to clarify Resolution -242, Egypt focused its diplomatic
efforts on removing any question about ultimate Israeli withdrawal from
all occupied territories, on obtaining a definitive recognition of the Pales-
tinians' right to establish a state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and
on designating the P.L.O. as the legitimate representative of the Palestin-
ian People.
Subject to these clarifications, Egypt has accepted the above de-
scribed framework for a peaceful political settlement since the late Presi-
dent Nasser accepted Resolution 242 in 1967. Nasser later affirmed this
framework for peace in 1970 when he accepted the Jarring Mission, and
the Rogers' Peace Plan.12 President Sadat followed the Rogers Plan until
the United States dropped it in response to negative reactions by Israel.
Clearly, President Sadat's efforts to secure peace with Israel have
been consistent with the general framework accepted by Nasser, though
only after a "war of attrition" which lasted close to two years. As will be
shown later in this article, Sadat designed the October 1973 War to accel-
erate the tempo of the political settlement and to provide the impetus for
11 31 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1976) 19, U.N. Doc. S/11940 (1976).
12 The plan was embodied in a letter dated June 19, 1970, from Secretary Rogers to the
Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs. See, 60 CURRENT HISTORY 46 (1971); Nadav Safran,
Israeli Politics Since the 1967 War, 60 CURRENT HISTORY 19 (1971); B. Reich, United States
Policy in the Middle East, 60 CumRRNT HISTORY 1 (1971). W. QUANDT, DECADE OF DECISION:
AmERICAN POLICY TowARD um ARD-IsRAm-CoNFLICT, 1967-1976, at 72-104. See also
Shaker, Egypt, the United States and the Middle East Peace, 33 EGYPT REV. INV'L L. 97
(1977).
13 See A. SADAT, IN SEARCH OF IDENTITY (1978). See also, Heikal, Egyptian Foreign Pol-
icy, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 714 (1978).
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a Sinai disengagement agreement; a goal accomplished in 1974.13 Sadat
continued his peace efforts in 1977 by traveling to Jerusalem, and by con-
cluding the Camp David Agreements. Thus, the October 1973 War not-
withstanding, Egypt has sought a peaceful political settlement with Israel
since 1967 under a consistent framework of principles.
II. THE BASIS OF EGYPT'S POLITICAL SETTLEMENT PEACE POLICY
After the 1967 War, Egypt's military capabilities were almost totally
destroyed. At that point, Egypt was faced with the task of developing a
realistic policy for peace with Israel. Three separate policy options were
considered: the first was a military option, the second was a no war-no
peace option, and the third was a political settlement option. It should be
noted at the outset that while the first and second options are not neces-
sarily inconsistent, the third option is incompatible with the other two.
Thus, Egypt had an irreversible choice to make.
After careful pragmatic analyses, Egypt concluded that a political
settlement was the only viable policy approach to achieve peace with
Israel. What follows is a description of the three policy alternatives con-
sidered and the rationale behind the conclusions ultimately reached.
A. The Military Option14
In making such a choice, Egypt had to assess its military capabilities
in relation to those of Israel. Between 1967 and 1971, Egypt's capabilities
were extremely limited, but between 1971 and 1973 they grew sufficiently
to support a limited military operation of short duration. After 1973,
Egypt's capabilities reverted to their post-1967 level. This post-1973 mili-
tary imbalance was caused by substantial increases in United States sup-
plies to Israel, coupled with a virtual shutoff of Russian supplies to
Egypt. President Sadat concluded then that U.S.S.R. support would not
be forthcoming. In addition, Syria continued to receive Russian supplies,
but could neither share them with Egypt, nor develop on its own a mili-
tary capability sufficient to offset Israel's.
Shortly after the 1973 war, Israel was in a position to easily overcome
the combined military forces of Egypt and Syria. Furthermore, it was
clear that air supremacy, as in the wars of 1948, 1956 and 1967, was out-
come-determinative in any military confrontation with Israel. In that re-
spect, it was unquestionable that every city and industrial site in Egypt
and Syria was vulnerable to attacks by Israel's superior Air Force.
' On the traditional aspects of military resolutions between Israel and the Arab states,
see J.C. HUREWITZ, MIDDLE EAST PoLrics: THE M.ILITARY DIMENSION (1970). For the 1973
War and its antecedents, see C. HERZOG, THE WAR OF ATONEMENT: OCTOBER 1973 (1975); W.
QuANDT, supra note 12, at 81, 126, 289, and 297.
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The defensive and offensive capabilities of Israel, when weighed
against those of Egypt and even those of other combined Arab states,
were overwhelmingly in its favor. The likelihood of redressing this imbal-
ance was very improbable in light of the United States strong commit-
ments to Israel. It was also apparent to all concerned that the U.S.S.R.
would not engage in an arms race to. supply Egypt or Syria, and that the
United States might directly intervene in a war which turned against
Israel's favor. This latter possibility was supported by the fact that the
United States flew supplies and equipment directly to the Sinai front
during the 1973 war, while the U.S.S.R. did not intervene on behalf of
Egypt or Syria, regardless of Israel's military successes. The position of
the U.S.S.R. derived essentially from the implications of "dtente" and
its own strategic priorities which did not call for any form of direct inter-
vention in the Middle East which it considered up to now of tactical im-
portance only.
Thus, the conclusion was reached that an all-out military option was
inconceivable for Egypt. This meant that only a limited military opera-
tion could be contemplated. Such an approach, however, raised two inter-
related questions: first, what would be its strategic objectives and second,
what would be its potential for tactical success?
The strategic objectives of any such plan would be to set in motion
the process of a negotiated political settlement, and to acquire a favorable
military position. The potential for success was essentially a question of
tactics and effective implementation. However, achievement of the de-
sired strategic objective would depend upon the complete or substantially
complete tactical success of the limited military operation. Any lesser de-
gree of success would not only cause its tactical and strategic failure, but
would be counter-productive in every respect.15
B. The No War-No Peace Option
The essence of the no war-no peace approach is the combination of a
variety of pressure-building strategies designed to erode the military, eco-
nomic, political and psychological capabilities of a given target. Its suc-
cess depended upon the ability to drain an opponent's resources, while
avoiding the same deleterious effects on one's own resources. The no war-
no peace option is therefore an intermediate strategy designed to pave
the way either to an all-out military policy, or to a political settlement.
Since Egypt had decided against an all-out military approach, only the
political settlement option could be the objective of such a strategy.
Therefore, the key factor was Egypt's ability to drain the resources and
staying power of Israel faster than Israel could sustain them, while main-
taining its own economic, social and political stability at the same time.
15 M. H. HEIKAL, Tm ROAD TO RAMADAN (1975).
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In this context, a no war-no peace option would require that Egypt
and Syria continue to build up military strength in such a way as to
maintain constant military, political, diplomatic, economic and psycho-
logical pressure on Israel without giving it the opportunity to justify or
carry out a preemptive military strike. The success of such an approach,
would depend on several other factors. First, Egypt and Syria would have
to develop a credible military strike capability, forcing Israel to increase
its own capabilities in order to maintain an effective deterrent against an
Arab attack. Second, American military and economic assistance to Israel
would have to remain the same, thereby making the costs of such
preparedness more burdensome to Israel's weakened economy. Third,
Egypt and Syria would have to be able to meet their own needs for eco-
nomic development and social progress, while sustaining high military ex-
penditures. Finally there would have to be a certain unity among other
Arab states to maintain a variety of economic, political and diplomatic
pressures on Israel through Israeli supporters, the least of which is not
the oil weapon.1 5"1
Realizing that all of the above conditions were not likely to occur,
Egypt decided not to pursue a no war-no peace strategy. The critical
question for Egypt in reaching this decision was the extent to which its
internal economic and social structure could withstand the exigencies of
such a strategy. A complex set of answers tended to show that Egypt was
not internally strong enough to pursue this strategy. Its population was
increasing at an exponential rate, which could not be contained or
matched by the existing or reasonably foreseeable rate of economic
growth. Certainly, the likelihood of the massive infusion of foreign capital
and technology necessary to produce the economic growth needed to keep
pace with the increasing needs of the country was remote in the context
of ongoing war and large scale military preparedness. Furthermore, Arab
military and economic assistance was not adequate even to maintain the
status quo; nor could the badly needed changes in social, economic and
governmental structures required to stimulate foreign investments in cap-
ital and technology be achieved under conditions of war.
Above all may be the fact that the ability of the Egyptian people to
withstand the tensions and pressures necessitated by this type of strategy
was eroded by the preceding phases of this costly conflict. After years of
Nasser's regime, Egypt's social and economic structures had become stul-
tified by a rigid, inefficient and somewhat corrupt bureaucratic system.
Against this background, the no war-no peace option had to be ruled out
both as a policy objective, as a strategy and as a tactic wAether before or
after the 1973 war.
C. The Political Settlement Option
By eliminating the all-out military option and the no war-no peace
I See Paust & Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon-A Threat to International Peace,
68 AM. J. INT'L L. 410 (1974), and contra, Shihata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its
Legality Under International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 591 (1974).
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option, the political settlement option was deemed the only viable alter-
native. Hence, President Nasser endorsed Ambassador Jarring's United
Nations mediating mission in 1969, and in 1970 he accepted United
States Secretary of State Rogers' peace plan. In 1971 President Sadat fol-
lowed that policy, designing the 1973 war as an instrument thereof. Sub-
sequently, the political settlement option was the clear focal point of me-
diation efforts by the United States, and of the diplomacy of Secretary of
State Kissinger."
The political settlement which Egypt sought could have been imple-
mented by a step-by-step approach, or through an overall multilateral ef-
fort. Initially, President Sadat favored the latter approach, and had urged
the convening of a peace conference in Geneva. However, at the insistence
of both the United States and Israel, Egypt ultimately accepted the step-
by-step plan, to be mediated by Henry Kissinger.17 More specifically, this
approach was to lead to an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel,
which would be followed by a similiar agreement between Syria and
Israel. These interim agreements would later be developed into an overall
settlement, involving Jordan and the Palestinians. This approach, in fact,
led to the 1975 Disengagement Agreement between Egypt and Israel, but
it failed to yield any other results.
The advantages of this approach, as perceived by Egypt in 1975, were
numerous. Primarily, it would demonstrate to the world Egypt's reasona-
bleness, good will and peaceful intentions; perhaps increasing Israel's dip-
lomatic isolation. It might also secure the return of some occupied terri-
tory to Egypt, which would be a precedent for similar results in the
future. It would also provide substantial foreign currency income to
Egypt from use of the Suez Canal without endangering the canal from
Israeli-held positions in the Sinai. And, in a broader sense, this peace ap-
proach would hopefully stimulate foreign investments and economic
development. And there was the prospect of oil in the Gulf of Suez.
A further consequence of the step-by-step plan was the possibility
that the United States might gradually reduce its economic and military
assistance to Israel, and even increase that given to Egypt. Certainly, the
continued burden on Israel to maintain its military strength in the midst
of its highly inflationary economy was seen as a benefit by Egypt.
However, as the first Arab state to arrive at an interim agreement
with Israel, Egypt perceived several disadvantages to the step-by-step
plan. A significant detriment, for example, was the creation of divisions in
the once unified Arab front, and Egypt's increased political isolation in
the Arab world. Concurrently, this plan generated dissent within certain
16 See Quandt, Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Disengagement Negotiations, 29 J. Ir'L
AFF. (Spring 1975) and e.g., H. KIssINGER, Wmrrm HousE YEARs 558-93 (1979).
17 E. SHEEHAN, THE ARABs, ISRAELI'S AND KISSINGER (1976).
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sectors of the Egyptian public and military establishment.18 Finally,
Egypt had placed itself in a position of exclusive reliance on the United
States, and lost any support possible from the Soviet Union. For the pur-
poses of the following discussion, these considerations will be analyzed
separately under the rubrics of "inter-Arab politics" and "super-power
politics."
1. Inter-Arab Politics
Egypt's analysis of inter-Arab politics focused on the Arab "rejec-
tionist front," and on Palestinian politics. In essence, the rejectionists'
position centered on the rejection of Israel as a sovereign Jewish state and
calls for its substitution by a Palestinian-Arab secular, democratic state.
The logical implication of this position is that no agreement can take
place with Israel which would give it legitimacy or recognition in and by
the Arab world. Egypt concluded that such a position was inflexible and
incompatible with the political settlement option which Egypt had chosen
to pursue.
To some extent, the rejectionists were then considered to have devel-
oped a certain tolerance for divergent policies because of their belief that
the ultimate destruction of the State of Israel made everything else "his-
torically irrelevant."19 (A position which has changed since Camp David).
At worst, their reaction to a political settlement plan was expected to
take the form of verbal criticism and rhetorical attacks centering on Pres-
ident Sadat and only peripherally on Egypt for a short period of time. On
its face an anti-Sadat and anti-Egypt campaign would appear harmful,
but the rejectionist policy could be skillfully turned into an asset since it
would enhance Egypt's credibility as a peace-seeking country in the eyes
of world public opinion. The same policy could also cause a counterreac-
tion in Egyptian public opinion, causing the Egyptian people to rally be-
hind Sadat.
Having reached this conclusion, Sadat turned to consider the extent
to which the choice of a political settlement might be accepted through-
out the Arab world and whether opposition to that policy could develop
into detrimental anti-Egyptian policies by other Arab states.20 Egypt con-
cluded that, while certain governments supported the rejectionist posi-
tion, few would seriously oppose Egypt over its divergent policy. In addi-
tion, Egypt assumed that Syria would actively join in the pursuit of a
M. H. HE IAL, THE CAmo DOCUMENTS (1973).
Statement attributhd to President M. Kadhafi of Libya and echoed by some P.L.O.
leaders in some arabic newspapers of Libya and Lebanon in October 1975.
20 See e.g., B. Boumos-GHALI, STUDIES IN ARAB DIPLOMACY (in Arabic-1973), a book he
wrote before becoming Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.
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political settlement approach shortly after indications of success. Egypt
expected a period of stress and pressure, but only between the time of
Egypt's acceptance of an interim agreement and Syria's subsequent ac-
ceptance of a similar one. After that, Egypt believed that the Arab world
would come to accept the fait accompli.
2. Super-Power Politics
Two basic assumptions were accepted by Egyptian policymakers in
1975 as fundamental. The first was that detente was more important to
the United States and the U.S.S.R. than were their respective Middle
Eastern policies and commitments. The second assumption, a conse-
quence of the first, was that the U.S.S.R. would not provide Egypt or
Syria with the military capacity to defeat a United States-backed Israel.
The conclusion was that neither the United States nor U.S.S.R. would do
anything, or permit others to do anything, which would significantly alter
the military balance of power in the area.
The only question then left for Egypt in 1975 was to determine the
extent to which it would keep up good relations with the U.S.S.R., while
tilting its position toward the United States. President Sadat chose to
forsake the U.S.S.R. for the United States, thereby giving up a known but
limited source of military supplies for a potentially abundant source of
economic and technical assistance in the form of foreign aid and private
investment.
Egypt saw no reason why it should not place its political settlement
option fortunes in the hands of the United States. Nevertheless, the pro-
cess through which it reached that decision was based on an appraisal of
a certain number of factors, among which was Secretary Kissinger's
formula for a step-by-step approach, which was not favored by Egypt.2 1
President Sadat's final decision was predicated on six basic assumptions:
(1) that Syria would soon enter into a similar agreement with Israel; (2)
that no unforeseen events would drastically alter the existing negotiating
climate between the parties to the conflict and between the United States
and the U.S.S.R.; (3) that Israel would develop more flexible responses
toward an overall political settlement compatible with the mainstream of
Arab positions; (4) that a workable formula would be developed to in-
volve the Palestinians in an ultimate peaceful settlement, acceptable to
them and to the Israelis and which would ultimately lead to the establish-
ment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza; (5) that the
internal Egyptian situation would remain stable; and, (6) that no events
"1 But see, Heikal, supra note 13, at 726-727 for a discussion of the opposing argument
that Egypt can not negotiate peace with Israel in isolation from the rest of the Arab world.
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would occur in the Arab world to drastically change the then prevailing
balance.
Of course, the inarticulated premise was that the United States
would continue its mediation efforts without favoring Israel over Egypt.
Sadat further assumed that after signing an interim peace agreement
with Israel, the situation in the Middle East would remain stable while
interim agreements between Syria and Israel and between Jordan and
Israel would be worked out. In an event, by signing an interim agreement
with Israel, Egypt ruled itself out of the state of war with Israel, including
economic and maritime blockades, as discussed below.
III. IMPACT OF THE 1975 SINAI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT ON EGYPT'S
SUBSEQUENT PEACE POLICY
Perhaps the greatest side effect of the 1975 Sinai interim Agreement
between Egypt and Israel was that it demonstrated that negotiation was
the most viable approach to peace. It also showed that Arab resilience
was possible even in the face of divergent inter-Arab policies, and it cre-
ated a challenge for Arab and Israeli critics to offer positive alternatives.
Indeed, prior to September 1975, the various anti-political settlement
forces in Israel and the Arab rejectionists, including the P.L.O., had been
unwilling to compromise, 2 1 1 (a position which was subsequently changed)
but the Agreement was expected by Egypt to be an incentive for an over-
all settlement.
Egypt suffered no political or economic setbacks by entering into the
1975 Agreement and, in fact, benefited from it in terms of increased
United States aid and foreign investments. Additionally, many of Egypt's
expectations were fully realized even though at the time of the decision
they were tenuous. For example, Syria and the P.L.O. opposed the in-
terim Agreement and denounced Egypt for executing it, but did not
break their relations with Egypt. In time, their opposition waned. Con-
currently, Egypt's popularity increased among Israelis and the United
States began to regard Egypt, and particularly President Sadat, as relia-
ble participants in the peace process.
In sum, the 1975 interim Agreement had softened the psychological
and political positions of the parties to the conflict, even though it did
not per se lead to any further agreements either with Egypt or with Syria,
Jordan or the Palestinians. The agreement became a fait accompli in the
Arab world and by the end of 1976 opposition to the Egyptian policy of a
political settlement all but disappeared. Nevertheless, Egypt became in-
creasingly skeptical about the step-by-step approach developed by Secre-
tary Kissinger. Thus, President Sadat argued more forcefully with the
2.1- For a discussion of Arab opposition to Sadat's policies see, F. Ajami, Between Cairo
and Damascus, 54 FoREruN AFFAIRs 444 (1976).
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United States that the next phase of the peace process should be an over-
all settlement; one that would include Syria, Jordan and the P.L.O.
Between 1976 and 1977, a vacuum developed in which President
Sadat pressed for a multilateral peace conference.2" When that effort
failed, he took the initiative and shifted his strategy to a bilateral Egypt-
Israel negotiating framework.
A. The Bilateral Approach
For the purpose of clarity, analysis of the bilateral approach is di-
vided into two categories; the first being the direct Egypt-Israel negotia-
tion, and the second being the United States mediation of Egypt-Israel
negotiations.
1. Direct Egyptian-Israeli Negotiations
By the summer of 1977, President Sadat concluded that a totally in-
dependent course of conduct was necessary. Thus in October of that year
he journeyed to Jerusalem. This dramatic gesture did not, however, sig-
nify any change in Egyptian policy. While Egypt's basic peace policy re-
mained essentially the same since 1967, the means of implementation had
been altered. Specifically, President Sadat's sense of personal commit-
ment to peace became more intense; and with the support of the Egyp-
tian people, Sadat changed the style and manner in which he carried out
his policy decision.23
In October 1977 President Sadat went to Jerusalem convinced that
he would return with a peace agreement or at least with an agreement on
the basic principles to which Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the P.L.O. could
later adhere to. His speech to the Knesset stressed the fact that only an
overall settlement could bring about peace in the region. Unfortunately,
Sadat was unable to secure either one of his objectives with Prime Minis-
ter Begin during that trip. Nevertheless, he had begun a new chain of
events and created a new psychological framework for peace.
Subsequent peace initiatives on the bilateral level soon led to a dead
end. Israel came to the Mena-House (Cairo) meetings at the ambassado-
rial level which lasted a few weeks and failed. The summit meeting at
22 See generally M.C. BASSIOUNI & M. KAPLAN, A MID-EAST PEACE PROPOSAL (The Uni-
versity of Chicago Center for Strategic Studies 1975, 2d rev. ed. 1977), in 5 DEN. J. INT'L L.
& POL'y 401 (1975). The United States under the Carter Administration also favored this
position, but it failed to convince Israel to reconvene a Geneva Conference set up by the
U.N. under the joint chairmanship of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in 1975 which led to the
1975 Sinai Disengagement Agreement between Egypt and Israel. Similarly, Egypt failed to
obtain Syria's agreement to the formula which was presented.
23 Sadat describes this in his autobiography supra note 13, at 271-313.
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Ismailia between Sadat and Begin followed, yielding two committees; the
military committee in Cairo which accomplished many gains, and the
subsequent political committee meeting in Jerusalem, which soon failed.
Throughout the process, Egypt had invited Syria, Jordan and the P.L.O.
to participate and, in particular, to attend the Mena-House (Cairo) meet-
ings. But the invitation was ignored. Thus Sadat's efforts to involve other
Arab participants in the process failed (as did the efforts of the United
States).
2. The United States Mediation of Egyptian-Israeli Negotiations
When direct Egypt-Israel negotiations failed, the United States regained
the initiative and acquired a renewed prominence in the peace process.
After months of stalemate between January 1977 and July 1978, a meet-
ing was arranged by the United States at the foreign minister's level and
was held in July 1978 at Leeds Castle in England. A few weeks prior to
that meeting, Egypt developed some new peace proposals which added
negotiating flexibility, but Israel rejected them before the Leeds meeting
took place. With that rejection there was nothing left to discuss, so Egypt
left the initiative with the United States once more. The United States
had the task of initiating both substantive and procedural formulas.
While still acting as a mediator, it became more actively involved, and
was drawn into the vacuum left by the failure of the previous negotia-
tions. This led to the Camp David negotiations and finally to an
agreement.
IV. THE 1978 CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS24
The Camp David Agreements consist of two documents executed on
September 17, 1978. One is entitled "A Framework for Peace in the Mid-
dle-East." Its preamble states: "The agreed basis for a peaceful settle-
ment of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations
Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts." "[T]o achieve a rela-
tionship of peace in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter,
future negotiations between Israel and any neighbors prepared to negoti-
ate peace and security with it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying
out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338." To the
extent that the Camp David Agreements incorporate Resolutions 242 and
338, it can be said that Egypt has followed a consistent peace policy.
However, there are several indications that the Camp David Agreements
are in fact a shift in Egypt's earlier policy principles.25
2' For the text of the Agreements, see 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. (no. 38) 1519-
1528 (Sept. 25, 1978).
215 See, F. SAYEGH, CAMP DAVID AND PALESTINE (AMEV 1978); CAMP DAVID: A NEw BAL-
FOun DECLARATION (ed. F. Zeadey, A.A.U.G. Special Report No. 3 1979).
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First, there is some question whether the separation of Egypt's terri-
torial claims from those of the other interested Arab nations is not itself a
departure from Egypt's prior policies. Second, the absence of a specific
reference in the framework agreement to Syria and its territorial claims
raises the question whether Egypt thereby relinquished its solidarity with
Syria and whether the omission constitutes an omission of substance.
Third, there is a question as to whether the autonomy language of the
agreement regarding the West Bank and Gaza precludes ultimate Pales-
tinian statehood or is merely a preparatory step leading to it. Finally, is
the prospect of elected officials from the West Bank and Gaza which are
ostensibly to become the recognized leadership of these territories incom-
patible with Egypt's 1974 Rabat Summit commitment to recognize the
P.L.O. as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian People"?
These questions raise issues with respect to Egypt's existing legal
commitments, under its mutual defense agreements with Syria" and Jor-
dan.2 7 These mutual defense agreements might be incompatible with a
separate peace agreement by any party thereto, so long as the other is
still subject to the occupation of its national territories. It may be argued
that Egypt is released from any further obligation if Israel's commitment
to the principles of "nonacquisition of territories by use of force" and
"the return of occupied territories" embodied in the Camp David Agree-
ments is sufficiently legally binding. But what if it is not fulfilled? Egypt's
obligations remain. Furthermore, Egypt's repeated and deliberate at-
tempts at having Syria and Jordan join the negotiating process might be
claimed as a release from any obligation to adopt the same posture as
Syria and Jordan, particularly since they had committed themselves to a
peaceful political settlement, which could only be accomplished through
some form of negotiating process. Egypt further justifies its position with
regard to any possible breach of the Egyptian-Syrian Defense Treaty on
the principle of rebus sic stantibus, which allows a party to alter its com-
mitments when circumstances which were the basic premise of the origi-
nal undertaking change. s
2 Joint Defense Treaty, Nov. 4, 1966, Egypt-Syria. The Treaty entered into force on
Mar. 9, 1967, in effect for five years subject to renewal, renewed in 1972. A question arises as
to its continued effectiveness and whether its non-renewal terminates any obligations Egypt
may have under it.
27 Joint Defense Treaty, May 30, 1967, Egypt-Jordan. The Treaty entered into force on
June 1, 1967, in effect for five years subject to renewal, renewed in 1972. A question arises as
to its continued effectiveness and whether its non-renewal terminates any obligations Egypt
may have under it.
28 For discussion of this principle see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art.
62, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, reprinted in 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969); The
Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 46 at 156-
158, 2 HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS, 448-565 (1935); Harvard Law School, Research in
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The above arguments may not provide Egypt with a complete justifi-
cation for its unilateral action in the Camp David Agreements with regard
to Syria and other Arab concerns. Egypt's action can be questioned in
that the framework agreement virtually sidesteps the issue of recognizing
the P.L.O. as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Also, the
agreed upon autonomy of the West Bank and Gaza which is to be negoti-
ated with Israel seems to skirt the issue of Palestinian self-determination.
The only concrete step toward some manifestations of self-determi-
nation implicit in the agreement is the procedure for community leader-
ship elections. However, this scheme represents a weakening of Egypt's
prior commitment to P.L.O. representation. In all other respects, Israel is
only bound to negotiate over the autonomy question with Egypt, and
there is nothing in the Framework Agreement which guarantees the im-
plementation of autonomy for the Palestinian people.
Along the same lines, the P.L.O. has claimed that the Camp *David
Agreements condone the Israeli settlements in occupied territories of the
West Bank and Gaza, and that the municipal leadership scheme for au-
tonomy will prevent the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in
that area. In addition, the P.L.O. feels that a five year transition period
'will erode the political will and ability of the Palestinian people to
achieve their goal of statehood.
The Egyptian response to these charges is that they are merely spec-
ulative and that the dismantling of the Israeli military government on the
West Bank and Gaza, the interim autonomy and the development of
elected municipal leadership are logical and necessary prerequisites for
permanent autonomy of the Palestinians. In that respect Egypt advances
that nothing precludes a meaningful role for the P.L.O. The assumptions
of President Sadat were that autonomy will set in motion certain devel-
opments on the West Bank and Gaza which will provide those territories
with the governmental infra-structure so necessary to statehood. Further,
the transitional period of five years is deemed necessary in order to
dampen Israel's suspicions and apprehensions about the creation of a Pal-
estinian State which is now unacceptable to a portion of the Israeli body-
politic. For Egypt the question of Palestinian statehood is merely one of
strategy and tactics within the political settlement approach which the
P.L.O. rejects. It must be noted that the apparent position of the P.L.O.
does not necessarily correspond to what it is likely to accept given the
offer of Palestinian statehood.2 9 The P.L.O.'s dilemma as indicated earlier
Int'l Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties and Comments reprinted in 29 AM. J.
INT'L L. Supp. 657, 1096 (1935); Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances (Rebus Sic
Stantibus), 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 895 (1967).
29 The problems of internal political struggles and ideological factionalism have existed
within the P.L.O. since its early days and have increased as the organization becomes more
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is that as a liberation organization it cannot abandon its claim to armed
struggle and maintain its credibility and leadership without having first
secured Israel's commitment to Palestinian statehood. Similarly, Israel's
dilemma in that respect is that it cannot make such a priori commitment
without negotiating in order to insure its own future security.
The second agreement, entitled Framework for the Conclusion of a
Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel also states: "[a]ll of the princi-
ples for U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute
between Israel and Egypt." The reiteration of Resolution 242 emphasizes
Egypt's continuity in policy though subject to the ambiguities of the Res-
olution as discussed above.
The question thus remains whether legally Egypt's peace settlement
with Israel is a severance of its solidarity with Syria, Jordan and the
P.L.O. or merely tactical diplomacy, without a substantive shift in policy.
Such a shift in tactical approach is not new to Egypt. Separate peace
initiatives including acceptance and participation in the U.N.'s Jarring
Mission, the Rogers' Peace Plan which spanned a period from 1967 to
1970, and the 1974 and 1975 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, have
been taken by Egypt. Nevertheless the basis for all such prior initiatives
was that resolution of the conflict would also be pursued on a multilateral-
overall settlement basis. Diplomatic and negotiation strategies have
moved in the direction of a bilateral agreement with Israel after failure to
gain Syria and Jordan's participation in the multilateral process. Egypt
maintains however, that while its peace initiatives with Israel are bilateral
in form, their substance remains multilateral because they are based on
Resolutions 242 and 338 which are multilateral principles to which Egypt
has remained faithful. Thus, Egypt argues that its diplomatic strategy
and the form of its agreements with Israel are to be considered in light of
its substantive policy which remains unchanged. If that distinction is ac-
cepted, then Egypt has remained consistent in its political settlement ap-
proach to the resolution of its conflict with Israel and vis e vis other Arab
participants.
As a result of the Camp David Agreements, Egypt may peacefully
regain territories lost in the 1967 war, and establish the basis for Palestin-
ian autonomy on the West Bank and Gaza. The former was Egypt's pri-
mary goal. The latter represents only a step in the direction of its other
goal, that of supporting Palestinian statehood. But in entering into this
representative of the entire spectrum of Palestinian views. See W. QUANDT, A. LESCH & F.
JABBER, THE POLITICS OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM (1973). See also Sharabi, Palestine
Guerillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness, THE MIDDLE EAST FORUM (No. 2-3) 44, 1970;
Towards a Democratic State in Palestine, (Fateh contribution to the 2d World Conference
on Palestine, Amman, 2-6 September, 1970); BAsic POLITICAL DOCUMENTS OF THE ARMED
PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, (Leila S. Kadi ed., P.L.O. Research Center, Palestine
Books, No. 27, Beirut 1960). For a historical survey see, WALTER LEHN, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE, (A.A.U.G. Info. Paper No. 14, June, 1974).
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agreement, Egypt has made the Arab-Israel conflict divisible. Further, the
agreement de-emphasizes the nature and extent of the conflict, giving
Israel a legitimacy which other Arab participants either deny in principle,
or regard as a bargaining chip for the ultimate resolution of all aspects of
the conflict. Nevertheless, Egypt has demonstrated that the peaceful po-
litical process accomplishes those results which other more costly and
dangerous means have heretofore failed to accomplish.
V. THE 1979 PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.3 0
On March 26, 1979 Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in Wash-
ington D.C. The Treaty was predicated on the two Camp David Agree-
ments of September 17, 1978. Between September 1978 and March 1979
Egypt and the United States sought but failed to obtain support from
Syria, Jordan, the P.L.O. and municipal leaders from the West Bank and
Gaza for the Camp David Peace Plan. The expectations which led Egypt
to the conclusion that it was in its best interest to enter into the 1975
Sinai Disengagement Agreement had been fulfilled by 1979. Thus the
same reasons that had motivated Egypt in 1975 led it to pursue its peace
policy toward Israel in 1979. The difference between 1975 and 1979, how-
ever, was that the earlier Agreement was an interim disengagement of
forces, the later one, a full-fledged Peace Treaty, political in nature.
Though apparently bilateral, the Treaty has multilateral features. The
Treaty was witnessed by the United States. It refers to the U.N. peace-
keeping forces and additional documents referring to it commit the
United States to certain undertakings. Thus, the Treaty embodies certain
multilateral aspects which tend to give it a sui generis multilateral char-
acter even though it is labelled a bilateral agreement between Egypt and
Israel.3 1 Several questions arise with respect to the Treaty and Egyptian
policy principles.
Since the Treaty provides for the return of all Egyptian occupied ter-
ritories, Egypt achieved its national policy objectives of total withdrawal
from its territories. This return of territory vindicates its consistent inter-
pretation of Resolution 242 as calling for total withdrawal from occupied
territories in contrast to Israel's interpretation of the Resolution which
30 Treaty of Peace, March 26, 1979, Egypt-Israel, reprinted in Dep't of State, Bureau of
Public Affairs, The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, (Dep't of State Pub. .8973, 1979). For an
excellent analysis of the Treaty and its Camp David antecedent see Murphy, To Bring to an
End the State of War: The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 897
(1979). For Egypt's official position explaining the Peace Treaty and the Camp David Agree-
ments, particularly with reference to their consistency with Egypt's historical position, see
MoAADAT AL-SALAm, THE PpncE TREATmS (in Arabic) (Egyptian Information Office, 1979)
and Takrir Ingaz Misrwal Mastala al Filistinia, 1945-1980 Report on the Defense of Egypt
of the Palestinian Question (Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1980).
3' The U.S. has undertaken several related obligations in separate Agreements with
Egypt and Israel which refer to the Treaty, see Middle East Peace Package: Hearings on
S.B. 1007, Senate Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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does not. Article 1(2) of the Treaty requires that Israel withdraw military
as well as civilian settlements established in the Egyptian Sinai. The
Treaty's reciprocal military security conditions, use of U.N. peace-keep-
ing forces, and forms of observation and verification are in keeping with
Resolution 242 and are consistent with Egyptian policy on the subject. All
other terms and conditions relating to military security arrangements in
the Agreement and supplemental documents relating thereto are compat-
ible with the principle of total withdrawal. These arrangements are not
inconsistent with Egypt's policy principles and the objectives it has pur-
sued since 1967.
The Treaty's implications with respect to Egypt's Arab commitments
fall into three categories:
(1). The legal obligations assumed by Egypt toward Syria and Jordan
by virtue of the respective mutual security agreements with these two
states.
(2). A legal obligation not to enter into a separate peace agreement
with Israel in accordance with the League's Pact, its Joint Defense
Treaty and a resolution of the League of Arab States of 1950, explicitly
and implicitly reiterated in similar resolutions since then.3 2
3. A political and moral obligation to the Palestinian people not to set-
tle separately with Israel while the Palestinian's right of self-determina-
tion and national independence in Palestine is unfulfilled and a political
commitment to the P.L.O. at the 1974 Rabat Summit Conference to rec-
32 League of Arab States Resolution of April 13, 1950:
First: To reaffirm the decision taken by the Political Committee on April 12,
1948, with the unanimity of Member States, which provides that the entrance of
the Arab armies into Palestine for its rescue should be regarded as a temporary
measure without occupation or partition significance, and that following its libera-
tion, Palestine should be handed over to its owners so that they may rule it in the
way they wish.
Second: To consider this decision as effective and expressive of the present pol-
icy of the Arab States in this respect.
Third: Should any Arab State violate this decision, it shall be considered as hav-
ing repudiated its obligations as well as the provisions of the Pact in accordance
with Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Pact, and the Special Annex regarding
Palestine.
Fourth: In the event of such violation, the Political Committee shall be convened
and take the necessary measures in accordance with the Provisions of the Pact.
See, H. HASSOUNA, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AND REGIONAL DISPUTES; A STUDY OF MID-
DLE EAST CONFLICTS 33-43 (1975), discussing the then prevailing problem with Jordan,
against which the resolution was drafted, because of that country's indications that it might
enter into a separate peace with Israel. See also e.g., M.F. ANABTAWI, ARAB UNITY IN TERMS
OF LAW (1975); al-Khadem, The Role of the League of Arab States in Settling Inter-Arab
Disputes, 32 EGYPT REv. INT'L L. 1 (1976). Note that art. 7 para. 1 of the Pact of the Arab
League makes the Resolution mandatory and the League's Joint Defense Treaty, art. 2 also
precludes a "separate peace."
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ognize only the P.L.O. as the "sole legitimate representative of the Pales-
tinian people."33
As to the first of these categories, the same arguments mentioned
previously regarding Egypt's entering into the 1978 Camp David Agree-
ments apply because of references in these agreements and in the Treaty
to the prospects of an overall peace settlement of all other issues in the
conflict by peaceful means and on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338.
However, a juridical issue arises as a result of the conflict between
the Treaty's obligations and Egypt's obligations toward Syria and Jordan
under their respective mutual security agreements. Egypt's separate
Peace Treaty with Israel precludes Egypt's resorting to force against
'Israel in support of its allies Syria and Jordan whose occupation of some
territories may be deemed an act of continued aggression. This consti-
tutes a direct conflict with Egypt's prior obligations toward Syria and
Jordan. To avert this problem, Egypt sought to insert ambiguous lan-
guage in Article VI of the Treaty, particularly a reference to the U.N.
Charter's Article 103. This allows Egypt to interpret the Treaty as not
superceding other agreements, such as the mutual security agreements
with Syria and Jordan. The language, ambiguous as it is, can however
only be interpreted, with reference to prospective changing conditions
and not to past ones. Thus, Article VI would apply to Egypt's other
Treaty obligations as to the future and not past conditions. A continuing
illegal territorial occupation could be deemed a past condition as well as a
future one. In that respect Egypt could still assert that its mutual secur-
ity agreements with Syria and Jordan could prevail over the Treaty.
Egypt's position is that the Treaty has to be read as a whole and that
Israel's undertakings to settle peacefully its disputes with the other Arab
participants on the basis of Resolution 242 requires its total withdrawal
from these territories. Egypt thus maintains that it has secured a promise
from 'Israel equivalent to Egypt's obligation under the mutual assistance
treaties and has thus discharged its legal obligation to assist Syria and
Jordan in the return of their occupied territories. Furthermore, Egypt as-
serts that should Israel not fulfill that obligation its continued occupation
of these territories would be in violation of the U.N. Charter which in any
event supercedes the Treaty. In such a case Egypt could claim that Arti-
cle VI of the Treaty could be invoked to resume support for Syria and
" The U.N. has given the P.L.O. official observer status in G.A. Res. 3237 (1974).
" Continued territorial occupation falls within the definitions of aggression adopted by
the General Assembly in G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. Al
9631 in accordance with the U.N. Charter. See, B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AG-
GRESSION (1975); Bassiouni, A Definition of Aggression in International Law: The Crime
Against Peace in M. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
(1973).
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Jordan. While this argument could be advanced with respect to Syria, it
could not be advanced with respect to Jordan because Egypt's agreement
to a negotiated autonomy of the West Bank does not contemplate the
return of the West Bank to Jordan as its mutual security agreement with
Jordan would call for. However, Egypt argues that this outcome is not a
foregone conclusion since the future of the West Bank is to be negotiated
and Jordan has been invited as a participant in that process. But to fulfill
the obligation to Jordan, namely the return thereto of the West Bank,
Egypt could be violating its pledge to Palestinian self-determination-a
typical "Catch 22" situation.
The second category, Egypt's obligation under the 1950 Arab League
Resolution which prohibits entry into a separate peace with Israel, has
been patently breached. But is such a resolution a legally binding obliga-
tion on Egypt or a mere political declaration? Under the League's Pact
the Resolution could be interpreted as legally binding and thus, Egypt's
membership in the League was suspended in 1979 and the League's head-
quarters moved from Cairo to Tunis. Egypt's position, however, is that
Israel's commitments to settle territorial and other issues with the other
Arab participants on the basis of Resolutions 242 (accepted by these Arab
states) relieves it from the obligation of the 1950 Resolution, and to that
extent does not make the Treaty a wholly separate peace. This argument
is supported by the Camp David Agreement, section C, paragraph 1, "As-
sociated Principles," which refers to the applicability of principles of
peace to other non-participating Arab states (though Egypt had no au-
thority whatsoever to act on anyone's behalf or behest).
The third category concerns two separate duties owed by Egypt. The
first is Egypt's obligation toward the Palestinian people to sustain their
claim to self-determination and national independence in Palestine. The
second is its undertaking at the Rabat Summit Conference to recognize
the P.L.O. as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian peo-
ple," a position recognized by the U.N.
There are two positions with respect to the first duty. One is that
Egypt sees the establishment of autonomy on the West Bank and Gaza as
compatible with the ultimate goal of Palestinian self-determination and
national independence of a portion of what was Palestine. The argument
is that statehood, the ultimate goal of the autonomy scheme, is left open
for future negotiations. Autonomy is the first step toward statehood. The
opposing argument is that this implicitly recognizes Israeli settlements in
these territories and Israel's right to be the negotiating partner as to the
future of these territories and the fate of its people which is contrary to
the objective of Palestinian statehood on the West Bank and Gaza. 5
11 It is also contrary in spirit to numerous U.N. resolutions on the rights of the Pales-
tinian People. There were two U.N. Resolutions passed in light of the Camp David Agree-
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Egypt's explicit recognition of the legitimacy, sovereignity, territorial in-
tegrity, and independence of Israel is contrary to the Palestine National
Covenant of 1964, amended in 1968. The Covenant states that one of the
aims of the Palestinian people is the reconstitution of Palestine as a "sec-
ular, democratic state" which opposes the existence of an exclusively Jew-
ish state in Palestine and thus opposes the State of Israel.36
The Palestinian's right of return, self-determination, and national in-
dependence are at the basis of the Arab critique leveled against Egypt for
entering into the Camp David Agreement and the Peace Treaty with
ments both which ostensibly oppose a bilateral separate approach between Egypt and Israel.
Question of Palestine, G.A. Res. 33/28A, 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 16, U.N. Doc. A/33/
45 (1978) states:
4. Declares that the validity of agreements purporting to solve the problem of
Palestine requires that they be within the framework of the United Nations and
its resolutions on the basis of the full attainment and exercise of the inalienable
rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return and the right to
national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, and with the participation of
the Palestine Liberation Organization.
The situation in the Middle East, G.A. Res. 33/29, 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 18, U.N.
Doc. A/33/45 (1978) states:
3. Reaffirms that until Israel withdraws from all occupied Palestinian and
other Arab territories, until the Palestinian people attains and exercises its ina-
lienable national rights, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle
East, in which all countries and peoples in the region live in peace and security
within recognized and secure boundaries, will not be achieved;
4. Calls anew for the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle
East, under the auspices of the United Nations and the co-chairmanship of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, with the
participation on an equal footing of all parties concerned, including the Palestine
Liberation Organization in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3375
(XXX) of 10 November 1975;
5. Urges the parties to the conflict and all other interested parties to work
towards the achievement of a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of
the problems and worked out with the participation of all parties concerned
within the framework of the United Nations;
6. Requests the Security Council, in the exercise of its responsibilities under
the Charter, to take all necessary measures in order to ensure the implementation
of relevant resolutions of the United Nations, including General Assembly resolu-
tion 33/28 and the present resolution, and to facilitate the achievement of such a
comprehensive settlement aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace
in the region.
It is to be noted that the Camp David Agreement speaks of "representatives of the Palestin-
ian People" but only in order to solve the "Palestinian Problem." No reference is made
therein, or in the Peace Treaty, to the Palestinians' right of self-determination. In fact, even
reference to the area of the "West Bank" was hotly disputed by the Israelis as evidenced by
a letter from President Carter to Premier Begin dated Sept. 22, 1978 which refers to that
area as "Judea and Samaria," the biblical names which are symbols for Israeli territorial
claims. See 17 INr'L LEGAL MAT. 1474 (1978).
36 See text in THE ARB-IsRAELi CONFLICT 1085 (J. Moore, ed. 1974).
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Israel,37 though the same arguments are also relied upon inter alia for a
political critique." Concerning the legal issues of self-determination,39 the
question is simply whether an argument in favor of Israel's ab initio ille-
gitimacy makes all of the territory which was once Palestine subject to
the rights of the original residents of that territory at the time of the
transformation of Palestine into Israel and their descendants as the only
group capable of determining its future, or is there an equitable analysis
that would allow for other outcomes."° In other words do the Palestinians
exercise their right of self-determination and national independence on
all or part of what was once Palestine? The legal and political positions
differ on that issue, and the United Nations has somewhat perpetuated
this ambiguity in that none of its resolutions on Palestine ever explicitly
resolved that issue.41 In fact no U.N. resolution on Palestine has ever
stated whether the Palestinians' right of self-determination is to be im-
plemented in all of what was once Palestine.42 It is an obvious conclusion
if one examines these resolutions in pari materia and contextually, that
the U.N. intended in 1947 (see partition resolution) and since then, that
there be two states in Palestine. In fact in its latest report on that issue it
states so under the heading: "VI. Two states in Palestine with rights and
obligations for each."'4 3 Thus in light of this, Egypt has taken the legal
and political position that the recognition of the State of Israel does not
'7 For a critique of Camp David and the Peace Treaty as violating the Palestinians'
right of self-determination, see Gendreau & Colin, Les Accords-Cadre Pour "La Paix au
Moyen-Orient" Conclus a Camp David, et le Traite Israeli-Egyptien Au regard du Droit
International, (pamphlet published by the International Association of Democratic Lawyers,
Paris 1979). See also, F. SAYEGH supra note 25; CAMP DAVID: A NEW BALFOUR DECLARATION
supra note 25 and E. SAID, THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE 182-238 (1979).
38 See Abdel-Malek, The Occultation of Egypt, 1 ARAB STUDIES QUAR4ERLY 177 (1979),
who claims that the peace process, which is a reflection of internal conditions, severs Egypt
from its political ideology opposing "Zionism and imperialism."
"' For a detailed study see M.C. BASSIOUNI, THE PALESTINIAN'S RIGHT OF SELF-DETER-
MINATION AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 8. See also, M. SHARABI, PALESTINE AND
ISRAEL 169-210 (1969) and E. Said, supra note 37 at 115-81.
10 Id. Cf., I. ABu-LUGHOD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF PALESTINE (1971). For a different
perspective, see Goldmann, The Future of Israel, 48 FOREIGN AFF. 443 (1970). For a com-
mentary on Mr. Goldmann's proposal, see Murphy, Neutralization of Israel, 65 Am. J. INT'L
L. 167 (1971); and Navasky, Israeli: "Groping," "Probing," N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1979, at
A35.
" See Resolutions and Decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council
Relating to the Question of Palestine, 1947-1975, 31 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 183/L.2,
(1976), and, THE RIGHT OF RETURN OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, U.N. Pub. ST/SG SER. FI/
2 (1978).
42 THE RIGHT OF RETURN OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, supra note 41, at 45. E.g., BAS-
SIOUNI, supra note 8. See also, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM
PART II: 1947-1977, U.N. Pub. ST/SG./SER.F/1 (1979) at 94 which states that the Palestin-
ian people have the inherent right to self-determination, national independence and sover-
eignty in Palestine. It does not say all or part thereof.
13 W.T. MALLISON AND S.V. MALLISON, AN INTERNATIONAL LAW ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE PALESTINE QUESTION, 55 U.N. Pub. ST/SG/
SER. F/4 (1979) (Study prepared at the request of the Committee on the Exercise of the
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. The views expressed are those of the authors.)
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violate the Palestinians' right of self-determination which can still apply
on those portions of what was once Palestine and is now part of Israel,
the West Bank and Gaza.
The second duty owed by Egypt to the P.L.O. is subject to the same
arguments mentioned earlier in connection with the 1978 Camp David
Agreement. The objection is that Egypt has departed from the commit-
ment it made to the P.L.O. at Rabat. Egypt claims, however, that the
exclusion of the P.L.O. during the stage of autonomy negotiations does
not preclude its future role as the representative of the Palestinian peo-
ple. Because the P.L.O.'s temporary exclusion from a given stage of the
process is not definitive, Egypt has not breached its political commitment
to the P.L.O. but has merely delayed its applicability. To emphasize its
Palestinian commitment Egypt introduced a requirement of linkage be-
tween its Treaty with Israel and the Palestinian question, but only as to
the extent of Israel's fulfillment of the scheme of autonomy and the de-
velopment of local municipal leadership. But during the 1980 negotiations
on autonomy which had clearly stalled, it became evident that Egypt's
posture on Palestinian autonomy was not weakening. Rather, quite to the
contrary, it even appeared to link progress on that subject to normaliza-
tion of relations between the two countries.
Th' political judgment question remains whether the 1979 Treaty
and the 1978 Camp David Agreements, all of which are to be construed in
pari materie, are susceptible of being interpreted only as a stage in the
process of fulfilling Palestinian self-determination and national indepen-
dence or do they foreclose this possibility. The answer depends on
whether the creation of new conditions on the West Bank and Gaza could
ripen into a sovereign Palestinian state, or whether such conditions would
in fact preclude such a possibility. Existing conditions cannot produce the
intended effect Egypt had in mind when entering into the Treaty.
Egypt's dilemma on the P.L.O.'s representative role remains the
same since Camp David. Israel and the United States would not accept
the P.L.O., a condition Sadat was unable to impose, and the P.L.O. would
not yield to the precondition of Israeli recognition as imposed by the
United States. These positions were intractable and Sadat accepted this
reality, but left the opportunity for change open. In fact, while nothing in
the Treaty and its related documents refers to the P.L.O., nothing ex-
cludes them either.
VI. CONCLUSION
Substantively, Egypt's position with respect to its national policy
principles and objectives has not changed. In fact Egypt has succeeded in
one respect by regaining its occupied territories, some of which have al-
ready been returned. However, its position vis a vis Syria, Jordan and the
P.L.O. has changed.44 Egypt's Peace Treaty with Israel does not mandate
4 A position that Egypt does not entirely concede but recognizes that a new situation
has developed. See the WORKING PAPERS OF MOHAMMAD ANWAR AL-SADAT: EGYPT AND THE
NEW ARAR REALrry (in arabic), Department of Information (released in 1980).
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a binding peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli
conflicts, other than through vague and ambiguous references. Egypt has,
however, unwillingly shifted the conflict from the arena of military con-
frontation between states, to the arena of urban guerilla warfare for the
Palestinians and to that of economic and political warfare between some
Arab states and Israel. But the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel
has introduced a new dimension of conflict into inter-Arab relations,
likely to escalate should the autonomy scheme for the West Bank and
Gaza develop along lines not likely to ripen into the creation of a sover-
eign Palestinian state. United States failure to produce that result would
accelerate radical trends in the Arab world and cause it long-term damage
of untold consequences. 45
The autonomy talks can be said to have reached a dead-end. A Euro-
pean initiative is underway to amend Resolution 242 in order to establish
the Palestinians' right of self-determination, possibly also including a
mention of their right to national independence as part of the territory
that was once Palestine in peaceful co-existence with Israel, and recogni-
tion once more that the P.L.O. is the "sole legitimate representative of
the Palestinian People." The United States has indicated its opposition
to such an approach in response to Israeli pressures. Egypt has indicated
that it would welcome it. This signifies the end of the Camp David Peace
Process which has now served its historic usefulness. Thus, new initiatives
must be forthcoming, and Egypt's role in representing the Palestinians
and other Arab interests is over. The P.L.O., Syria and Jordan are the
new protagonists with whom the United States and Israel must deal. Af-
ter that there will still be Jerusalem, an issue still left to be addressed.4"
45 A prospect discussed in E.M. FIsHER & M.C. BAssiOuNi, STORM OVER THE ARAB
WORLD (1972).
48 See Tibawi, Jerusalem: Its Place in Islam and Arab History in THE ARtB-IsRAmi
CONFRONTATION OF 1967 (I. Abu-Lughod, ed. 1970).
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